Address on the Crisis in the Balkans at the Center for Strategic and
                  International Studies (CSIS) 

                  "Thank you, Bob, and thanks to everyone at CSIS for so graciously providing me a forum to share a
                  few thoughts on the crisis in the Balkans. I've been having a terrible time finding media opportunities
                  to get my views out, so I appreciate your help. 

                  "In all seriousness, I wanted to discuss the situation in a little more detail than is generally allowed in
                  television and radio interviews, and I can think of no other place in town where a speaker's views are
                  given thoughtful consideration primarily because of the venue in which they are delivered. Over the
                  years I have been in Congress, I've been privileged to discuss a number of important questions with
                  the eminent opinion leaders who make their home here at CSIS. I am very grateful to have the
                  opportunity to do so again in this critical hour. 

                  "As we all know, wars seldom go according to plan. That is all the more true when leaders don't
                  seem to have a plan - a viable plan, anyway - as appeared to be the case as we went to war with
                  Serbia. That criticism, I concede, is a little exaggerated, but it is not entirely facetious. To request an
                  additional 300 aircraft three weeks into the war is not an indication that everything is on track. 

                  "Administration officials repeatedly claim that they expected the tragic events that occurred after the
                  air campaign began, a claim that has been greeted with much deserved derision by just about
                  everyone. 

                  "We went to war to coerce Slobodan Milosevic into accepting the terms of the Rambouillet accord,
                  an accord that was intended to end atrocities against the Kosovars, to provide Kosovo with political
                  autonomy protected by a NATO peacekeeping force, and to prevent open hostilities in Kosovo from
                  inciting hostilities in other countries and destabilizing the region. 

                  "Within two weeks after the first NATO airstrike, Serb military and paramilitary forces were in
                  complete control of Kosovo after having waged a campaign of atrocities against ethnic Albanians the
                  likes of which we never expected to see again in Europe. Moreover, as part of their aggression Serbia
                  has deliberately promoted instability in Macedonia, Albania, and threatened aggression against
                  Montenegro. 

                  "If the Administration had expected these developments to occur, they might have warned the
                  Kosovars who signed the Rambouillet agreement with the implicit promise that NATO would protect
                  them. 

                  "I think it is safe to assume that no one, including me, anticipated the speed with which Serbia would
                  defeat our objectives in Kosovo, and the scope of that defeat. Yes, the war is only three weeks old,
                  and yes, NATO can and probably will prevail in this conflict with what is, after all, a considerably
                  inferior adversary. But victory will not be hastened by pretending that things have just gone
                  swimmingly. 

                  "Worse, unless we all, administration supporter and detractor alike, look critically at both why we
                  went to war in the Balkans, and why we have failed to achieve our ends, I fear the administration and
                  our NATO allies might commit the gravest mistake we could make at this time: changing our ends to
                  make our means more effective rather than employing more effective means to achieve our ends. 

                  "Surely, some of our terms for peace will have to be modified to correspond to new realities on the
                  ground and to achieve our ultimate ends, which are security for the Kosovars and peace and stability
                  in the Balkans. Genuine autonomy for Kosovo that includes the presence in Kosovo of 5000 Serb
                  military and security personnel is hard to conceive as practical anymore. I think it would be a pretty
                  hard sell to convince Kosovars that it is safe to return to communities that are policed by the very
                  people who so savagely depopulated them. Nor do I think it likely that the Kosovo Liberation Army
                  can be persuaded again to accept any status less than independence. 

                  "We might need to expand our demands to accomplish our essential purpose. But I worry the
                  administration might do the opposite. I worry that our purpose will be reduced because the
                  administration is unwilling to change the means we use to accomplish it. Degrading Serb's military
                  was not identified as an end of our intervention until air strikes failed to achieve our initial goals. It
                  isn't an end; it's a means to an end. It doesn't even mean anything. Knock out one tank or one SAM site,
                  and you have degraded their military. 

                  "It seems clear to most observers that NATO's use of force against Serbia suffered from the beginning
                  from two critical tactical errors. The first is an excessively restricted air campaign that sought the
                  impossible goal of avoiding war while waging one. The second is the repeated declarations from the
                  President, Vice President, and other senior officials that NATO would refrain from using ground
                  troops even if the air campaign failed. These two mistakes were made in what almost seemed willful
                  ignorance of every lesson we learned in Vietnam. I am not haunted by memories of Vietnam, but I
                  must admit I never thought we would again witness in my lifetime the specter of politicians picking
                  targets and ruling out offensive measures in the absurd hope that the enemy would respond to our
                  restraint by yielding to our demands. 

                  "As almost anyone with any war experience knows, you're never supposed to show the enemy what
                  you won't do to win. You only make more likely the failure of whatever action you are willing to take.
                  Air strikes that did not immediately bring home to the Serb people as well as the Serb regime just
                  how overwhelmingly powerful a force they were now confronting predictably failed to dissuade
                  Milosevic from ruthlessly pursuing his abhorrent goals. 

                  "For air strikes to have any chance of preventing Milosevic's awful atrocities they needed to be, from
                  the beginning, massive, strategic and sustained. No infrastructure targets should have been off limits.
                  And while we all grieve over civilian casualties as well as our own losses, they are unavoidable.
                  When nations settle their differences by force of arms a million tragedies ensue. That's why we try to
                  avoid it. War is a much more terrible thing than cruise missile attacks on Iraqi radar sites. But losing
                  a war is worse. 

                  "Force should always be a part of but not a substitute for diplomacy. Whether our diplomacy in the
                  months preceding the use of force was well conceived and well conducted we will no doubt debate at
                  length in the future. I do believe that the threat of force is a necessary component of diplomacy when
                  trying to affect the behavior of tyrants like Milosevic. But we've all heard reports that some
                  administration officials believed that the threat of force alone was such a powerful incentive for Serb
                  cooperation that the threat may have dominated other aspects of diplomacy. I don't know whether the
                  charge is deserved or not. But I do know that we were not adequately prepared to make good on that
                  threat, which suggests that its use was somewhat cavalier. 

                  "When a president threatens war he should plan for it. And, at a minimum, when he intends to use very
                  limited means to wage war, he should have a contingency plan ready for their probable failure.
                  President Clinton seems to have had neither a Plan A nor a Plan B. And, for reasons that completely
                  elude me, he and the Vice President doggedly persist, in opposition to widespread bipartisan
                  criticism, in publicly ruling out any preparation for the possible deployment of ground troops. 

                  "If war against Serbia was necessary then winning the war is necessary as well. That is a trite remark,
                  I know. But the administration's policy is so mystifying to me that it begs such obvious criticism. 

                  "Did we have sufficient reason to go to war? There is, of course, widespread disagreement about that.
                  Both supporters and opponents marshal sound arguments in their favor. I have a general rule that the
                  use of force, with all its attendant tragedies, should be reserved for grave threats to both our strategic
                  interests and our political values. Indeed, I believe our national security policy should and generally
                  has concentrated on questions where our interests and values clearly converge. Containment and the
                  Reagan Doctrine are obvious examples. 

                  "We all agree that America's most important values -- "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" --
                  are under vicious assault by the Milosevic regime. But there is an honest debate about whether our
                  vital interests were at risk in this conflict. 

                  "Many critics have cited events in Rwanda, the Sudan and elsewhere as examples comparable to or
                  exceeding Kosovo of horrific inhumanity in areas outside the vital interests of the U.S. where we
                  declined to intervene with force. As my friend and articulate advocate for a narrowly defined
                  nationalist foreign policy, Pat Buchanan says, "Whose flag flies over Pristina has never been an
                  American concern." 

                  "I don't know if we could have stopped ethnic cleansing in Kosovo by means short of force. I think the
                  United States should inaugurate a 21st Century policy interpretation of the Reagan Doctrine, call it
                  rogue state rollback, in which we politically and materially support indigenous forces within and
                  outside of rogue states to overthrow regimes that threaten our interests and values. Surely, Milosevic's
                  regime, which has started four wars in the last ten years and is infamous for its brutal racism, merited
                  such treatment. But I don't know if there was sufficient time for either more effective diplomacy or
                  assistance to Milosevic's opponents to prevent him from laying waste to another subject population.
                  Perhaps there was, and it is a question well worth exploring at a later time. 

                  "Nevertheless, I sincerely believe that Serbia's assault on Kosovo did threaten our interests, and thus
                  its defeat is a cause worth fighting for. I'm not convinced that it would have destabilized the entire
                  region. It might have, and God knows it threatens to do so now if we don't bring this conflict to a
                  successful conclusion as soon as possible. But I do believe that Milosevic's ambitions directly
                  threaten two extremely important American interests: our global credibility and the long-term
                  viability of the Atlantic Alliance. 

                  "First, our credibility. It seems to me obvious on the face of it that after two separate American
                  presidents warned Milosevic that the United States would not tolerate Serb aggression against
                  Kosovo, and after President Clinton twice delivered ultimatums to Milosevic to come to terms at
                  Rambouillet or else, that the failure to make good on those threats would devastate our credibility
                  everywhere in the world. And by that I don't mean President Clinton's credibility our Secretary
                  Albright's credibility or any other individual's credibility. I mean our credibility - American
                  credibility. 

                  "The consequences of that damage would be severe. Surely, other rogue state dictators would be
                  encouraged to challenge us more aggressively. But I fear that other, larger powers, would become
                  bolder as well, not necessarily or only by posing security challenges, but by complicating our
                  leadership on international questions from proliferation control to economic crises. 

                  "Friend and foe alike perceive a gap between a great power's rhetoric and its actions as weakness.
                  Our enemies, of course, will soon test our resolve in other ways to determine how far they can exploit
                  our debility. Our friends will seek new arrangements to compensate for what they perceive as our
                  unreliability. Thus, whether we had a strategic interest in the Balkans or not we acquired one the
                  moment we threatened force. Credibility is a strategic asset of the highest order, and well worth
                  fighting to maintain. 

                  "Second, I fear that NATO, the most successful alliance in history, would not survive another decade
                  much less another half century should we fail to impose our will on an inferior but dangerous
                  European power. Alliances are not ends in themselves. They are formed to protect our interests. We
                  shouldn't neglect our interests to form alliances. 

                  "Flush with success but unable to modernize its mission, NATO is suffering an identity crisis, a crisis
                  that has sparked three troubling developments. 

                  "First, our allies are spending far too little on our mutual defense. The day is fast approaching when
                  each member's forces won't be able to communicate with each other on the battlefield. It is imperative
                  that we persuade our allies to increase their support of the Alliance. Not only because American
                  popular support for NATO will erode in the absence of greater allied burden sharing, but to maintain
                  the alliance as an effective fighting force. 

                  "Second, Europe's growing determination to develop a defense identity separate from NATO. Once
                  only the product of French resentments, the idea of a separate defense identity is now even entertained
                  in London. We must be emphatic with our allies. We welcome their efforts to assume more of their
                  own defense, but only within the institutions of NATO. Defense structures accountable to a European
                  organization other than the Alliance would ultimately kill the Alliance. Would Turkey be excluded? I
                  suspect it would. Would Turkey then remain in NATO, and would NATO survive Turkey's
                  withdrawal? Doubtful. 

                  "Moreover, its not hard to envision our allies intervening militarily, under the auspices of their new
                  defense organization and without our concurrence, in very difficult problems that they are unprepared
                  to resolve, necessitating an eventual appeal to NATO to bail them out. America's support for
                  membership in NATO would soon evaporate in those circumstances. 

                  "That support will also disappear if the United States and its allies cannot come to an agreement on
                  when we should act in mutual defense of each other's interests outside Europe. I doubt we can achieve
                  such a consensus if we fail to agree on where we should act in defense of our interests in Europe. 

                  "Most Americans believe we intervened in Bosnia and in Kosovo at the behest of our NATO allies.
                  They are, of course, not exactly mistaken in that view. In part, we are in the Balkans because our
                  allies want us to be involved in efforts to prevent conflict there from threatening their interests. Most
                  Americans, at least before we went to war with Serbia, could not see the connection between our
                  security and Milosevic's crimes. 

                  "They can, however, see the impact of Saddam's refusal to honor the terms of the Gulf War cease-fire,
                  and they don't understand why some of European allies decline to help us enforce those terms. Most
                  Americans recognize the threat of proliferation, and they can't understand why our allies are often
                  dismissive of our attempts to keep rogue states from acquiring these weapons. 

                  "If the United States bears the greatest share of our mutual defense, then we expect our allies to pay as
                  much attention to our concerns, in and out of Europe, as we do to theirs. And if we are unwilling to
                  help defuse what President Clinton called a "powder keg in the heart of Europe" then the prospects of
                  achieving consensus on an out of area mission is very remote. 

                  "I believe these two strategic interests of the United States, together with our obligations to defend the
                  values which define our nation, justified the use of force against Serbia. And if those interests and
                  values were at risk before we intervened, they would be gravely, probably mortally wounded if we
                  do not prevail. 

                  "That is why I find it so utterly inexplicable that the President, having identified a serious threat to our
                  national interests and values, refuses to employ the means necessary to defeat it. It has struck me that
                  the President has spent at least as much time assuring us, and our adversary, that he will not deploy
                  ground troops as he has explaining to us why we went to war in the first place. I doubt anyone in this
                  room or any military strategist anywhere would justify mapping the limits of our resolve to an enemy
                  we are presently at war with. 

                  "I agree that Russia is a concern. But I do not believe that Russia's leaders, who govern a country that
                  practically lacks an economy, perceive their relationship with a renegade Serbian regime to be a
                  paramount interest that takes precedence over the advantages it needs to acquire through a good
                  relationship with the West. But if reason does entirely desert Russian leaders, it will happen not
                  because we threatened or even introduced ground troops into Kosovo, but because we allowed this
                  conflict to drag on indefinitely while irrational nationalism grew and eventually overwhelmed
                  Moscow. 

                  "It seems clear to me that the best course for us, NATO, Kosovo, Russia and even Serbia is to begin
                  fighting this war as if it were a war, with huge stakes involved, instead of some strange interlude
                  between peace initiatives. That means, regrettably, an immediate and manifold increase in the
                  violence against Serbia proper and Serbian forces in Kosovo. I still fear that NATO's political
                  leaders are interfering with General Clark's prosecution of the war. Again, avoiding casualties, theirs
                  and ours, is not our primary objective. Winning is, the sooner the better. 

                  "To that end, we should commence today to mobilize infantry and armored divisions for a possible
                  ground war in Kosovo. Hopefully, taking this overdue action will convince Milosevic that there is no
                  self-imposed limit to our determination to liberate Kosovo from his tyranny. But if it doesn't, we will
                  be prepared to do what we must to end this conflict on our terms. 

                  "The Serbs will fight, and we must prepare the country for the inevitability of casualties. But we
                  should not let ignorance frighten us into paralysis. NATO is more than a match for the Serbian
                  military, a military, after all, that has faced no greater challenge than fighting a small, outgunned KLA,
                  and terrorizing old men, women and children. Serbia is a country the size of Ohio, with ten million
                  people and an army with outdated Soviet equipment, much of which I hope has been destroyed by our
                  airstrikes. 

                  "The concern that we will become bogged down in a long campaign in Serbia, and then stuck in a
                  permanent garrison of Kosovo is overstated. We are a vastly superior power, and we are fully
                  capable of completely destroying Serbian opposition. Moreover, should we be forced to intervene on
                  the ground, I doubt very much that the Milosevic regime could survive the inevitable defeat of the
                  Serbian military. And with the collapse of the regime, I would hope that prospects for peace and
                  stability in the region, and the restraint of ethnic hostilities improve. At any rate, I doubt a successor
                  Serb regime would be in a hurry to recover Kosovo by force. United States forces should not be
                  permanently stationed in Kosovo to protect its integrity. I don't believe we would stay for years and
                  certainly not decades as some opponents of U.S. intervention warn. 

                  "Finally, Congress should -- this week -- debate and vote on a resolution authorizing the President to
                  use whatever force necessary to force Serbia from Kosovo. Silence and equivocation will not
                  unburden us of our responsibility to support or oppose this war. I do not recommend this course
                  lightly. I know that should Americans die in a land war with Serbia, I will bear a considerable share
                  of the responsibility for their loss. I and any member who shares my views must be as accountable to
                  their families as the President must be. 

                  "But I would rather face that sad burden than hide from my conscience because I sought an
                  advantageous political position to seek shelter behind. Nor could I endure the dishonor of having
                  known my country's interests demanded a course of action, but avoided taking it because the costs of
                  defending them were substantial, as were its attendant political risks. 

                  "Contrary to popular belief, members of Congress are honorable people. The only honorable course
                  is for us all to vote our conscience. If those who oppose this war and any widening of it prevail, so be
                  it. The President will pursue his current course until its failure demands we settle on Milosevic's
                  terms. Those who feel that course is preferable must accept blame for whatever negative
                  consequences ensue from our failure. 

                  "Should those of us who want to use all force necessary to end this war on our terms prevail, then, as
                  I said, we must accept responsibility for our losses. But all members of Congress should then cease
                  further debate and unite to support the early accomplishment of the mission. 

                  "Let me close by urging the Administration and the Congress to show the resolve and confidence of a
                  superpower. Our cause is just and our early success is imperative. Let us keep our nerve, and see the
                  thing through to the end no matter how awful the images of war appear on our televisions. The costs of
                  failure are infinitely greater than the price of victory."

